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Comment
Using Public Money to Influence the
Electorate: Is There Corruption Which
Needs Correction?
The Founding Fathers recognized that the use of public funds'
for political purposes could corrupt the free election system. Since
the first days of our nation, state legislatures and courts have
struggled to develop standards which would effectively prevent
public officials3 from utilizing public funds to promote political
ideas before legislatures and the electorate! Within the last twenty
years, courts have distinguished between election expenditures and
lobbying expenditures Courts have held that it is an appropriate
1. "Public funds" is defined as funds belonging to government, or any department of the
government, in the hands of public officials. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1106 (5th ed. 1979).
2. Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206,217, 551 P.2d 1, 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697,705 (1976). "A
principal danger feared by our country's founders lay in the possibility that the holders of
governmental authority would use official power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies,
in office; the selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of course, raises the specter of just
such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral process." Id (citation omitted).
3. "Public official" is defined as the holder of a public office, though not all persons in
public employment are public officials, because a public official's position requires the exercise of
some portion of the sovereign power, whether great or small. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (5th
ed. 1979).
4. See generally Note, The Use of Public Funds for Legislative Lobbying and Electoral
Campaigning, 37 VAND. L. REv. 433, 436-44 (1984) [hereinafter Public Funds]. See generally
Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 218,551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 706. The promotion of political ideas can
take many forms. Some examples of promoting political ideas before the legislature are hiring a
lobbyist, drafting legislation, or using public employees to advocate positions on legislation. Id at
218, 551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705. Examples of promoting political ideas before the electorate
include buying bumper stickers, paying officials for speeches which advocate one side of a political
issue, or developing brochures which encourage voters to endorse a particular political viewpoint. Id
at 221, 551 P.2d at 11, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
5. See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (stating that lobbying expenditures are
permissible and election expenditures are prohibited).
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function of government to lobby legislatures,6 however, courts have
uniformly prohibited the use of public funds to influence the
electorate.
7
In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of
laws regulating the use of both public money and private money
spent on election campaigns.8 Political expenditure regulation
applies to both public and private contributors and recipients.
Conversely, the prohibition on the use of public funds expressly
prohibits public expenditures on campaigns and is silent as to
private expenditures. A multitude of statutes regulate the reporting
of, and in some cases, limit the amount of, public and private
campaign contributions.9 The purpose of these statutes is to subject
campaign contributions to public scrutiny."
6. Public Funds, supra note 4, at 438-43. Courts have held that public funds can be used to
hire a lobbyist to monitor, advocate, and draft legislation. See, e.g., Crawford v. Imperial Irrigation
Dist., 200 Cal. 318, 253 P. 726 (1927); Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927); Hays
v. Kalamazoo, 316 Mich. 443, 25 N.W.2d 787 (1947).
7. Public Funds, supra note 4, at 438-43. See infra notes 23-152 and accompanying text
(citing court opinions which have prohibited the use of public funds to influence the electorate).
8. There are numerous statutes and regulations which require financial disclosure by
contributors, candidates, and political committees. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 81000-91015
(Deering 1989 & Supp. 1990). This Comment focuses specifically on the issues associated with the
expenditure of public funds on political activities. These issues are distinct from issues associated
with limits on campaign contributions, regardless of whether the contribution was made with public
or private funds, and these issues are also distinct from issues associated with campaign disclosure
requirements.
9. See, e.g., id §§ 85301-85303. In addition to campaign disclosure requirements, some state
and local governments have imposed limits on contributions. See id. §§ 85101, 85301-85303.
Recently, for example, the citizens of California adopted two campaign finance reform initiatives,
Proposition 68, the Campaign Spending Limits Act of 1986, and Proposition 73, the Campaign
Contribution Limits Without Taxpayer Financing Amendments to the Political Reform Act, which
set limits on campaign contributions. See id §§ 83116, 84106, 84302.5, 85100-85700 (enacted or
amended by Propositions 68 and 73). The future of Propositions 68 and 73 is uncertain at the time
of this publication. See Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices
Commission, 51 Cal. 3d 744, _ P.2d. _. to be reported at 274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (November 1,1990)
(invalidating the provisions of Proposition 68 since Proposition 73 at the same election passed with
more affirmative votes and is inconsistent with Proposition 68); see also Service Employees Int'l
Union v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 747 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (invalidating
Proposition 73 as a violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution).
10. CAt. GOv'T CODE § 81002(a) (Deering 1989). This section explains the public policy
supporting disclosure of campaign contributions, stating, "Receipts and expenditures in election
campaigns should be fully and truthfully disclosed in order that the voters may be fully informed and
improper practices may be inhibited." Ild.
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While there are numerous statutes regulating the disclosure of
campaign contributions, there are no statutes specifically
prohibiting the expenditure of public funds for political activities.11
The prohibition of public funds on campaigns has developed
exclusively through the common law.'2 Two distinct bodies of law
govern two related issues: Campaign contribution regulation and
regulation of public expenditures. Both bodies of law, however,
may be at issue for a single expenditure. 3 For example, if a public
agency spends public funds in support of a candidate, two issues
may arise: (1) Whether the agency properly disclosed the
contribution in compliance with the campaign disclosure laws, 4
and (2) Whether the agency had the legal authority to spend public
funds in support of a particular political viewpoint. 5 It is the latter
of these two issues which is the topic of this Comment. The critical
question within this body of law is: What standard will be used to
define impermissible public political expenditures? 6
California, like other states, has developed its own standard for
prohibiting public officials from authorizing political campaign
11. Note, Liability of Public Officials for the Improper Expenditure of Public Funds, 65
CALIF. L. REV. 482, 483 (1977). See also infra notes 23-152 and accompanying text (citing cases
which have prohibited the use of public funds for political activities).
12. See infra notes 23-152 and accompanying text (setting forth the case history of the
prohibition on public political expenditures). California Penal Code section 424 prohibits the
misappropriation of public funds by public officials. CAL. PENAL CODE § 424 (Deering 1985). This
section has been used to convict government officials who misappropriate public funds. See, e.g.,
People v. Dillon, 199 Cal. 1,248 P. 230 (1926); Webb v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 872, 248
Cal. Rptr. 911 (1988). Penal Code section 424 does not address the issue of when a political
expenditure is or is not authorized. CAL. PENAL CODE § 424 (Deering 1985). However, some courts
have used the general theory of illegal unauthorized expenditures to invalidate unauthorized political
expenditures. See, e.g., People v. Battin, 77 Cal. App. 3d 635, 143 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1978): People v.
Sperl, 54 Cal. App. 3d 640, 126 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1976).
13. See Fair Political Practices Commission v. Suitt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 132, 153 Cal. Rptr.
311, 315 (1979).
14. See, e.g., Fair Political Practices Commission v. Suitt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 129-30, 153
Cal. Rptr. 311, 313-14 (1979).
15. See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206,218-21,551 P.2d 1, 9-11, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697,
705-07 (1976).
16. See id. at 222, 551 P.2d at 12, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 708 (expressing the court's considerations
in developing a standard). See also infra notes 49-91 and accompanying text (citing cases which
have focused on the criteria to be used in determining which expenditures will be permissible).
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expenditures. 7 Part I of this Comment examines the development
of this standard in California courts.8 Part II discusses League of
Women Voters v. Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination
Commission,9 a recent court ruling which relaxed the prohibition
against the use of public money and appears to conflict with
previous California Supreme Court and state appellate court
decisions.'0 This Comment will conclude that League of Women
Voters not only appears to conflict with the law as set forth by the
California Supreme Court, but also undermines the policy
justifications for disallowing the use of state funds for
electioneering.21 Finally, Part HI suggests modifications of the
current standard in an effort to settle apparent inconsistent holdings
among the California courts of appeal.'
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. California Supreme Court Decisions
One of the first California Supreme Court cases which squarely
addressed the issue of improper state political expenditures was
Mines v. Del Valle.' The court held that government expenditures
to promote political viewpoints must be explicitly authorized by the
state legislature.' In addition, the court held that public officials
17. See infra notes 49-91 and accompanying text (citing California cases which have helped
define the law in this area). See also Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273,287,257 P. 530,537 (1927).
"'To use public funds to advocate the adoption of a proposition ... should be manifestly unfair..
• and the action of so doing cannot be sustained, unless the power to do so is given [by the
legislature] ... in clear and unmistakable language." Il The issue of improper use of public funds
is distinguishable from the issue of a public official's right to assert his or her opinion. Since this
Comment focuses specifically on the improper use of public funds, the constitutional issues raised
by government spebceh will receive only cursory treatment.
18. See infra notes 23-184 and accompanying text.
19. 203 Cal. App. 3d 529, 250 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1988).
20. See infra notes 185-214 and accompanying text (explaining the holding in the League of
Women Voters case).
21. See infra notes 210-27 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 215-52 and accompanying text.
23. 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927).
24. 1& at 287, 257 P. at 537.
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who authorized such expenditures would be held strictly liable.'
In other words, any public official who authorized political
expenditures without specific legislative authorization would be
required to reimburse the government for the loss, regardless of the
degree of care exercised by the official.26
In Mines, the members of a public utility commission, the Los
Angeles Public Service Commission (LAPSC), used approximately
$12,000 of public funds to support an upcoming bond election,
including expenditures for printing banners, circulars, postcards,
and partisan advertisements in local newspapers.27 Each of these
advertisements was intended to influence the voters. 8 The court's
analysis began with the proposition that all governmental
expenditures must be authorized by the legislature, either explicitly
or implicitly.29 However, the power to spend public funds on
campaign expenditures must be explicitly authorized by the
legislature in "clear and unmistakable language."" Although the
commission argued that the legislature had implicitly authorized"
political expenditures by the commission, the court stated that
implicit authorization was not sufficient when public funds are
expended on campaign activities.2 The court found that the
25. Id. at 288-89, 257 P. at 537.
26. Id at 288-89, 257 P. at 538.
27. Id at 276, 257 P. at 532. In this case, the political activities in support of a bond measure
were clearly campaigning. Id. at 276, 257 P. at 532. The expenditures were for "'printing cards,
banners, automobile windshield stickers, automobile banners, labels, circulars, handbills, dodgers, and
postal cards," all of which encouraged voters to support the measure. Id at 276, 257 P. at 532.
Public funds were also used to pay wages of public employees who used their time to work on the
campaign. Id
28. Id.
29. Id. at 281-86, 257 P. at 534-38. When expenditure of public funds is not made in
connection with promotion of a political position, the authorization by the legislature for the activity
can be either explicit or implicit. Id Accord, Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 213, 551 P.2d 1, 6,
130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 702 (1976).
30. Mines, 201 Cal. at 287, 257 P. at 539. The issues of legislatively authorized political
activities and the resulting constitutional concerns are beyond the scope of this Comment.
31. Since the statute authorizing the commission to appropriate funds stated that the
commission was empowered to spend public funds for conducting, operating, and maintaining and
extending power plants, the commission argued that it had implicit authorization to promote a bond
measure in an attempt to extend and maintain existing facilities. Id. at 282, 257 P. at 535.
32. Id
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legislature had not given the commission specific authorization to
make campaign expenditures.3
The court then considered whether the fact that the commission
members acted in good faith in authorizing the expenditures
relieved them from legal responsibility.3' The court stated that
public officials' duties are well defined, that their modes of
procedure are delineated with particularity, and that any issue as to
their duties could be resolved by consulting the officials' publicly
financed attorney." The court thus concluded that any illegal
expenditure, regardless of an official's knowledge or intent, would
give rise to liability.' The court stated that the commissioners
were to be held strictly liable.37
Fifty years after Mines, the California Supreme Court reiterated
its prohibition against the use of public money for political
purposes.3 In Stanson v. Mott,39 the court unanimously reaffirmed
the Mines holding that without explicit legislative authorization, a
public official could not spend public funds to promote a position
in an election campaign.' However, the court overruled the strict
liability holding of Mines.4' The court stated that public officials
are liable only if they violate their duty to exercise "due care."4
33. Id.
34. Id at 288, 257 P. at 537.
35. Id at 282, 257 P. at 535.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 289, 257 P. at 537.
38. See Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 218-20, 551 P.2d at 9-11, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705-06. The court stated, "[w]e need
not resolve the serious constitutional question that would be posed by an explicit legislative
authorization." Id
41. 17 Cal. 3d at 226-27, 551 P.2d at 15, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
42. Id The court stated, "[Public officials must use 'due care,' i.e., reasonable diligence, in
authorizing the expenditure of public funds, and may be subject to personal liability for expenditures
made in the absence of such due care." Id Courts are allowed to consider "whether the
expenditure's impropriety was obvious or not," "whether the official was alerted to the possible
invalidity of the expenditure," and "whether the official relied upon legal advice or on the presumed
validity of an existing legislative enactment or judicial decision in making the expenditure." Id at
227, 551 P.2d at 15-16, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711-712. If a public official was negligent in authorizing
an expenditure, the official would be held personally liable. Conversely, if the official was not
negligent, the official would not have to reimburse the state for the expenditure. Id. The Stanson
court noted that other states applying the "due care" standard have held public officials liable if they
spend funds having reasonable cause to suspect that the expenditures might be improper, or if they
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In Stanson, the director of the state Department of Parks and
Recreation, William Penn Mott, authorized the expenditure of more
than $5,000 of public funds to promote the passage of a park bond
measure.4" The promotion included preparing a brochure
supporting the measure, paying for public officials' expenses
related to traveling and speaking in support of the measure, and
paying for a three person staff dedicated to promoting the act's
passage." The purpose of the park bond measure was to raise
funds for the state so that the department could acquire additional
park land and recreational and historical facilities. ' One day
before the election, Sam Stanson, a taxpayer, filed suit claiming
that Mott had authorized an illegal expenditure of state funds.'
fail to prevent an improper expenditure because of negligent performance of their official oversight
duties. I at 226-27 n.12, 551 P.2d at 15 n.12, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711 n.12. There has been one
California Supreme Court case which specifically discussed this liability. See Keller v. State Bar, 47
Cal. 3d 1152, 1173, 767 P.2d 1020, 1033, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542, 555 (1989), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2228
(1990) (holding that the Board of Governors of the state bar could have reasonably believed that it
had authority to take action based on prior boards' actions.) Although the decision in Keller was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court, the provisions relating to "Stanson" issues were not
addressed by the United States Supreme Court.
43. Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 210, 551 P.2d at 4, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
44. l at 210-11, 551 P.2d at 4, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
45. Id at 209, 551 P.2d at 3, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
46. Id Mines addressed the issue of standing, stating that, "public funds illegally or
unlawfully paid out by a public official can upon a suit by a taxpayer be recovered and the officer
or officers responsible for said illegal or unlawful payment compelled to repay the same." Mines v.
Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 289, 257 P. 530, 538 (1927). Also, California Code of Civil Procedure
section 526a provides for injunctive relief as follows:
An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal
expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a
county, city or city and county of the state, may be maintained against any
officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a
citizen resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable
to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid,
a tax therein.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (Decring 1989). California Code of Civil Procedure section 526a has
been held to apply to suits against state agencies and officials. Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 223, 551 P.2d
at 13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 709. See Duskin v. San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, 31 Cal. App. 3d
769, 773-74, 107 Cal. Rptr. 667, 670 (1973) (holding that section 526a applied to officials of
agencies created by state law). See also Blair v. Pitchless, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 267-68, 486 P.2d 1242,
1248-49, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48-49 (1971) (holding that courts will construe section 526a liberally to
allow taxpayers to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged because
of the standing requirement). See generally Collins and Meyers, The Public Interest Litigant in
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The court held that since the expenditures authorized by Mott
promoted the passage of a measure which was to be presented to
the voters, and since Mott did not have specific legislative
authorization, the expenditure was illegal. 7 The court stated,
however, that Mott would have to personally reimburse the state
only if the authorization was made negligently.'
The Stanson decision, considered in light of subsequent case
law in this area, can be interpreted as establishing a three prong
test for finding that there has been an impermissible expenditure of
public funds on political activities. 9 First, in order to find an
impermissible expenditure, Stanson requires that public funds be
spent on "promotional" activities and not on "informational"
activities." The court held that if a public entity was merely
California: Observations on Taxpayers'Actions, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 329 (1977); Meyers, Standing
in Public Interest Litigation: Removing the Procedural Barriers, 15 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 1 (1981)
(explaining generally that California Civil Procedure Code section 526a is applicable to state agencies
and officials).
47. Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 216-18, 551 P.2d at 8-9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 704-05. The court did
not distinguish between expenditures on candidates and expenditures on ballot measures. I. at 218,
551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705. Like expenditures on candidates, expenditures on bond issues
and other non-candidate elections were held to be "campaign expenditures." 16. The justification for
this holding was based on holdings in previous cases. See id. (court's citation to prior cases). The
court stated that "to date judicial decisions have uniformly held that the use of public funds for
campaign expenses is as improper in bond issue or other noncandidate elections as in candidate
elections." Id.
48. Id. at 226-27, 551 P.2d at 15-16, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12.
49. Id. at 213-27, 551 P.2d at 6-16, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 702-12; See infra notes 77-152 and
accompanying text (describing the additions to and clarifications of the Stanson standard as found
in post Stanson case law).
50. Id at 221,551 P.2d at 11, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08. The distinction between informational
and promotional activities in Stanson only applies to activities that have not been specifically
authorized by the legislature. Id If the legislature specifically authorizes a public entity to spend
public funds for campaign purposes, the expenditure is per se valid under Stanson. If the legislature
explicitly authorizes campaign expenditures there are, instead, constitutional concerns. Id See infra
notes 132-33 and accompanying text (briefly explaining that constitutional concerns arise because
government political expenditures jeopardize individuals' freedom of speech). In California, however,
there are only two code sections which authorize public entities to participate in election activities.
See CAL EDUC. CODE § 35174 (Deering 1989); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8246(b) (Deering Supp. 1990).
Therefore, in almost every circumstance where public funds would be used for political purposes in
California, there will not be legislative authorization. The result is that questions of improper political
expenditures present issues addressed in Stanson and do not, as a general rule, present constitutional
issues. California Education Code section 35174 provides in part: "The governing board of any
school district or any member of the governing board of a school district may prepare or disseminate
information or may make public or private appearances or statements for the purpose of urging the
passage or defeat of any school measure of the district." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35174 (Deering 1989).
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informing the voters and not trying to persuade them, then the
activity was permissible. 1 The court never explicitly defined
"promotional" and "informational," and stated that the line
between the two is not clear.'2 The court did indicate, however,
that informational activities are characterized by a fair and unbiased
presentation of the facts." Conversely, promotional activities are
ones in which the state explicitly advocates a position or at least
presents the facts in such a manner as to favor one side of an
issue.' The court ruled that the distinction between promotional
and informational activities should be developed on a case by case
basis and that "no hard and fast rule governs every case."" The
ambiguous informational/promotional distinction was clouded
further when the court stated that each activity was to be examined
separately based on the "style, tenor, and timing" of the
communication.
It is unclear whether the legislature authorized board members to spend public funds in promotion
of a campaign. At a minimum, a board member is authorized to make appearances. Id, California
Government Code section 8246(b) authorizes the Commission on the Status of Women to state its
views. The code section states: "The commission is expressly authorized to state its position and
viewpoint on the issues developed in the performance of its duties and responsibilities as specified
in this chapter." CA.. Gov. CODE § 8246(b). Like the aforementioned Education Code section, this
Government Code section does not specifically state that the public entity is authorized to spend
public money on election activities. See id
51. Id. at 221, 551 P.2d at 11, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
52. ld at 222, 551 P.2d at 12, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
53. Id. at 221-22, 551 P.2d at 12, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
54. Id
55. Id.
56. Although no court has given practitioners much guidance on how to weigh these factors,
it is clear that courts consider such factors as whether the activity started just before an election and
was suspended just afterward and whether the activity was designed to change the minds of voters
on issues that are to appear on the ballot. Id See Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1172, 767
P.2d 1020, 1032, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542,555 (1989), rev'd 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990), (the court took into
consideration the fact that the activity had transpired only one month before the election and that the
defendant had distributed the "kind of material" which would be used in a campaign).
57. Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 222, 551 P.2d at 12, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 708. Since that time,
commentators have expressed concern over the ambiguities raised by the Stanson decision. See Note,
Liability of Public Officials for the Improper Expenditure of Public Funds, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 482,
486 (1977) [hereinafter Liability]. Some have argued that the absence of clear definitions for
"promotion" and "information" would lead to great confusion among public officials, lawyers, and
courts. Id Although confusion has resulted, no California court has yet modified the ambiguous
informational/promotional distinction. See id. "These criteria provide very little new instruction to
those concerned with legal limits of electioneering." Id See also Public Funds, supra note 4, at 447
(stating that the promotional standard in Stanson "can present serious definitional difficulties").
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The second prong of the test raises the issue of whether the
political expenditure has been explicitly authorized by the
legislature. 8 If an expenditure by a public official is expressly
authorized by the legislature, the expenditure is not within the
Stanson prohibition, although there may be other legal
considerations which would prohibit the expenditure.59 Since
express legislative authorization is the result of a decision by
elected officials, legislatively authorized expenditures are not
subject to Stanson challenges; however, these expenditures can be
challenged on constitutional grounds.' Specifically, one can
challenge such an expenditure on the basis that the government's
voice in the election hinders another's freedom of speech.6 Since
most questionable governmental political expenditures in California
are not explicitly authorized by the legislature,' most questions of
governmental political contributions will turn on Stanson issues and
therefore will not be decided on first amendment concerns.
The third and most widely debated prong of the Stanson test
relates to the purpose of the questioned political activity. The court
stated that a state political expenditure is impermissible only if it
is related to a measure or candidate to be voted on by the people.0
The court, therefore, distinguished between lobbying expenditures
and expenditures on election campaigns, permitting the former and
prohibiting the latter.' The court allowed lobbying expenditures
because promoting legislation is one of the "primary functions" of
elected officials, and because public officials must promote
58. Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 213, 551 P.2d at 6, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 702. The general type of
activity must be authorized. Id There is no requirement that the specific expenditure in question be
authorized by the legislature. Il
59. L
60. L at 219, 551 P.2d at 10, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
61. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUToNAL LAW § 12-4, at 588 (1978)
(discussing constitutional challenges). Even though government speech and its relation to the first
amendment is an important related issue, such issues are too broad to include within the bounds of
this Comment.
62. Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 218,551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705 (stating that the legislature
rarely authorizes a public entity to spend public funds for political purposes).
63. Ia at 217-19, 551 P.2d at 10, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705-06.
64. l at 218, 551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
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legislation to effectively implement their programs.' Further, the
court held that promoting legislation does not undermine the
legislative process since legislative proceedings provide an
opportunity for all sides of an issue to be heard.' The court
explained that hearings before legislative committees are open to
the public and do not require an interested citizen or group to
spend funds to voice their opinion.' The government's
involvement in actively supporting a bill does not prevent the
opposition from presenting a conflicting view.'
Unlike the legislative process, the electoral process is not
always an open forum.' A distinction can be made between the
legislative process, which affords all parties a chance to voice their
opinion, and the electoral process, which requires that one spend
funds to communicate one's viewpoint to the electorate.7"
Persuading the electorate can be an expensive proposition and one
which is advantageous to those with financial resources.71 The
government's participation in the election process will, in many
cases, overshadow conflicting viewpoints.72
It is clear that the Stanson court held that state expenditures for
lobbying state legislators are permissible.7' Government entities do
not need explicit authorization, but instead need only implicit
legislative authorization, to spend funds advocating measures before
the legislature.74 Since Stanson is the most widely cited case in
65. Id.
66. Id. "Since the legislative process contemplates that interested parties will attend legislative
hearings to explain the potential benefits or detriments of proposed legislation, public agency
lobbying ... in no way undermines or distorts the legislative process." Id
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id
70. Id
71. See id.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id at 218, 551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705. The court stated that:
[One of the primary functions of elected and appointed executive officials is,
of course, to devise legislative proposals to attempt to implement the current
administration's policies. Since the legislative process contemplates that
interested parties will attend legislative hearings to explain the potential
benefits or detriments of proposed legislation, public agency lobbying, within
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this area of the law, since it was the first California Supreme Court
case which discussed the first and third prongs of the test," and
since the case reiterated the second "authorization" prong, as
established by Mines,' Stanson's outline of the legal requirements
in this area will be used as the framework for evaluating all
subsequent cases. Specifically, the cases will be examined to
determine which prong or prongs were discussed and how each
prong was either reaffirmed or modified.
Eight years after Stanson, the California Supreme Court
decision in Stevens v. Geduldig" slightly modified the third prong
of the test, which prohibits public expenditures on matters before
the electorate and allows public expenditures on matters before the
legislature.78 Although the Stevens court did not change the first
or second prongs of the test, the court expanded the number of
activities which could be characterized as permissible "legislative"
activities.' The court held that public expenditures promoting
legislative constitutional amendments are equivalent to public
expenditures on legislative matters and therefore are not prohibited
by Stanson. ° By allowing public expenditures on legislative
constitutional amendments, the court widened the "permissible
purpose" prong to include legislative measures which will
eventually be the subject of an election campaign.8 The Stanson
court did not discuss whether a measure which starts in the
legislature but necessarily is the subject of an election campaign is
considered a legislative matter or a campaign matter. The Stevens
court concluded that such a measure is a legislative one.8"
the limits authorized by statute... in no way undermines or distorts the
legislative process.
Id.
75. 1&. at 217-223, 551 P.2d at 8-13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 704-09.
76. Id
77. 42 Cal. 3d 24, 719 P.2d 1001, 227 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1986).
78. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction between
expenditures on lobbying and expenditures on campaigns).
79. Stevens, 42 Cal. 3d at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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In Stevens, former Governor Ronald Reagan created a state-
funded task force to study all aspects of state taxing and spending
in California. 3 The task force recommended to the Governor that
the best method for implementing a tax reduction was to pass a
constitutional amendment, and the Governor directed the task force
to draft the amendment at the state's expense." When the
legislature failed to pass the amendment, the Governor decided to
attempt to qualify the measure as an initiative to be presented to
the voters on a statewide ballot." A taxpayer challenged the
legality of the drafting and lobbying expenditures, claiming that
such expenditures were promotional, not explicitly authorized by
the legislature, and were for election and not lobbying purposes."
The taxpayer claimed that these expenditures were illegal under the
Stanson rationale."
In holding that the expenditures by the task force were
permissible, the supreme court relied on the trial court's finding
that all of the drafting work was done, and all of the public money
was spent on the state constitutional amendment, not on the
initiative.8 Oddly enough, the language used in the initiative was
the same language crafted for the constitutional amendment at state
expense.89 The court stated that the use of the Governor's staff to
draft a constitutional amendment for the Governor was permissible,
since the drafters were not attempting to influence voters.' The
court summarily concluded that Stanson stood for the proposition
that activities related to legislative constitutional amendments are
83. Md. at 28, 719 P.2d at 1003, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
84. Id at 30, 719 P.2d at 1005, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
85. Id. at 31, 719 P.2d at 1005, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
86. Id. at 27-28, 719 P.2d at 1003, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
87. Id
88. Id. at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
89. Id at 31, 719 P.2d at 1005, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
90. Id at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412. Cf. infra notes 124-127 (emphasizing
the importance of the "'audience" who would be the subject of the promotion).
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akin to legislative lobbying activities and that public expenditures
on these amendments were therefore permissible.9
The Stevens court's approval of drafting expenditures on
constitutional amendments may have an impact that extends beyond
drafting expenditures and beyond constitutional amendments. Since
the rationale in Stevens is that a legislative constitutional
amendment is akin to legislative lobbying,' one could argue that
any public expenditure of a political nature spent on a legislative
constitutional amendment or bond measure will be permissible
as long as the expenditure is implicitly authorized. It is also
possible that future courts may hold that any activity in support of
a legislative constitutional amendment or bond measure would be
legal, as long as the activity is not aimed at influencing voters.
It is questionable whether courts should consider legislative
constitutional amendments and bond measures as legislative
measures and therefore a permissible purpose under the third prong
of the Stanson standard. A significant distinction can be drawn
between ordinary legislative lobbying and preparing a constitutional
amendment or bond measure. A California legislative constitutional
amendment, like a bond measure, must receive approval of not
only the legislature but also a majority of the electorate.'
Therefore, constitutional amendments and bond measures have a
dual nature: They are both legislative enactments and ballot
measures. Furthermore, since legislative constitutional amendments
and bond measures are ballot measures and will ordinarily be the
subject of vigorous campaigns, both in favor and in opposition, any
assistance provided to support one side of the measure may skew
the electoral process. Since the objective as stated in Stanson is to
91. Stevens 42 Cal. 3d at 36,719 P.2d at 1008,227 Cal. Rptr. at 412. The court stated, "We
ust reject the suggestion that the task force funds were used for nongovernmental purposes which
could not properly be financed by state revenues .... The drafting of a constitutional amendment
on behalf of the Governor, and lobbying on its behalf with the Legislature, is a permissible use of
public funds." Id. (citing Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 218, 551 P.2d 1, 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697,
705 (1976))
92. Stevens, 42 Cal. 3d at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
93. Bond measures must be proposed by the legislature, passed by the legislature, and then
passed by the electorate to become effective. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
94. Id.; CAL. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 1.
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prohibit the government's interference with elections, it is arguable
that public expenditures in support of legislative constitutional
amendments and bond measures should be prohibited.9
Although the Stanson opinion never specifically discussed
public expenditures on legislative constitutional amendments, the
court in Stevens interpreted Stanson as allowing the expenditures
for the drafting of a legislative constitutional amendment.' The
basis for this conclusion was that the constitutional amendment in
Stevens had to be approved by the legislaturer before it was
placed on the ballot.98 One could argue that to be consistent with
the third prong of Stanson, the court in Stevens should have
inquired into the advantage that the questioned activities bestowed
upon those who supported the constitutional amendment. In fact,
the court in Stanson held that public expenditures on legislative
activities were permissible because one's opportunity to be heard
is not dependent upon financial resources.' Some commentators
have argued that persuasive legislative lobbyists are hired only by
wealthy employers and that individuals without those resources are
ineffective. Courts have found this argument unconvincing."
Unlike mass media campaigns for ballot measures or candidates,
95. Some critics may argue that it is proper for public money to be spent on measures that
will initially appear before the legislature even if the measure must ultimately be submitted to the
electorate. Once public funds are spent in support of the measure, however, there is an advantage
bestowed to the proponents. This advantage will have been given to the proponents at taxpayer
expense and will have the effect of helping the proponents gain acceptance, not only before the
legislature, but also before the electorate. A dollar donated by the government to the proponents at
an early stage of the process is an extra dollar the proponents can use promoting their idea before
the electorate.
96. Stevens, 42 Cal. 3d at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
97. CAL. CoNST. article XVII, §§ 1-2. There are two methods of amending the California
Constitution. Under article XVIII, section 1, a legislative constitutional amendment is proposed by
a two-thirds vote of the legislature and enacted by a majority of the voters. L. § 1. Under section
2, the electors may amend the constitution directly by initiative. Id. § 2.
98. Stevens, 42 Cal. 3d at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412. "'The trial court
rejected a proposed finding that the task force activities encompassed promotion of an initiative
measure, and found instead that its activities involved preparation and promotion of a constitutional
amendment before the Legislature.- Ida (emphasis added).
99. Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 218, 551 P.2d 1, 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 705 (1976).
100. See generally i
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legislative hearings are public forums in which anyone, with or
without financial resources, can attend and present viewpoints.''
The issue raised, but never explained, in Stevens is why
political activity financed by the government in support of a
proposal which will ultimately appear on the ballot, such as a
legislative constitutional amendment or bond measure, is
comparable to a proposal which will never appear before the
electorate, such as a legislative bill. This issue is not discussed in
Stevens, and the court never recognized the distinction."
Although the court never addressed the crucial distinction between
legislative constitutional amendments and statutory bills, the court
held that expenditures on constitutional amendments are sufficiently
analogous to expenditures in the legislative process as to justify
support with public funds. 3
The Stevens court may have contradicted Stanson by permitting
public expenditures in support of a measure to appear before the
voters."l° Since Stanson disallowed government financing of
activities that assisted one side of an election campaign," and
since drafting and conducting research assists one side with
influencing voters, it is arguable that the holding in Stevens in
effect overturned Stanson as it relates to the publicly financed
101. Id.
102. See Stevens, 42 Cal. 3d at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
103. Id Some may argue that publicly financed activity which is directed to the legislature,
regardless of its effect on future election campaigns, should be permitted. Such a proposition may
be supported by a narrow reading of Stanson. See Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 218, 551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 705 "One of the primary functions of elected and appointed executive officials is, of course,
to devise legislative proposals." This argument is unpersuasive in that it ignores the language in
Stanson and Mines which states that the purpose of the prohibition is to disallow the government's
role in assisting one side in an election. See infra notes 160-84 and accompanying text (explaining
that the policy behind the Stanson prohibition is to prohibit the government from assisting one side
in a campaign).
104. Compare Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 218, 551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705 with Stevens,
42 Cal. 3d at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (demonstrating that Stanson prohibited
campaign expenses, while Stevens permitted drafting expenses for a measure which was to become
the subject of a political campaign).
105. See Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 219-222,551 P.2d at 10-12, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 706-08. See infra
notes 153-84 and accompanying text (describing the policy of prohibiting government support for
one viewpoint in an election).
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drafting of legislative ballot measures."° There is no indication in
Stevens, however, that the supreme court would allow public funds
to be allocated to preparation of non-legislative ballot measures."
B. California Court of Appeal Decisions
Since Stanson, five state appellate decisions have focused on
the first prong of the test, the promotional/informational
standard."i All five explicitly followed Stanson and did not
significantly alter the concept of "promotional activity."" In
People v. Battin" the court of appeal ruled that a candidate
could not utilize public employees to assist with election
matters."' In Battin, a supervisor from Orange County instructed
his county staff to assist him in his bid for lieutenant governor.12
The staff addressed and stuffed envelopes, sent out press releases,
made phone calls, and delivered various political materials in an
106. Compare Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 218, 551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705 with Stevens,
42 Cal. 3d at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (Stanson appeared to prohibit campaign
expenses on all ballot measures, while Stevens permitted drafting expenses for a legislative ballot
measure).
107. Stevens, 42 Cal. 3d at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
108. See People v. Battin, 77 Cal. App. 3d 635, 143 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1978); Miller v. Miller,
87 Cal. App. 3d 762, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1978); Miller v. California Commission on Status of
Women, 151 Cal. App. 3d 693, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1984); Fair Political Practices Commission v.
Suitt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 153 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1979); Common Cause v. Duffy, 200 Cal. App. 3d
730, 246 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1987). Two other state appellate court decisions that have discussed Stanson
are Keller v. State Bar, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1135, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2228
(1990) and Harvey v. County of Butte, 203 Cal. App. 3d 714,719,250 Cal. Rptr. 65, 67-68 (1988).
Both cases include only short discussions of the Stanson issue, and neither suggests a modification
of the Stanson standards. Keller, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 1168, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 470-71; Harvey, 203
Cal. App. 3d 719,250 Cal. Rptr. at 67. The California Supreme Court opinion in Keller v. State Bar,
47 Cal. 3d 1152, 767 P.2d 1020, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1989) applies the promotionalyinformational
standard but does not discuss the merits of the standard, nor does the court suggest any modifications
to the standard. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1170, 767 P.2d 1034, 255 Cal. Rptr. 556.
109. See People v. Battin, 77 Cal. App. 3d 635, 143 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1978); Miller v. Miller,
87 Cal. App. 3d 762, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1978); Miller v. California Commission on Status of
Women, 151 Cal. App. 3d 693, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1984); Fair Political Practices Commission v.
Suitt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 153 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1979); Common Cause v. Duffy, 200 Cal. App. 3d
730, 246 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1987). See infra notes 110-52 and accompanying text (explaining the facts
and holdings in each of these five appellate court cases).
110. 77 Cal. App. 3d 635, 143 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1978).
111. Id. at 657, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
112. IcE at 643, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
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effort to assist the candidate's campaign."' The court held that
publicly funded staff had been used for campaign purposes"4 and
that such activities are prohibited by Mines and Stanson."'
Miller v. Miller"6  (hereinafter Miller 1) and Miller v.
California Commission on the Status of Women"7 (hereinafter
Miller I) are two additional California decisions that have
invalidated unauthorized state political expenditures."' Both
decisions relate to the same action. While Miller I was the review
of a decision granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendant,"9 Miller II involved an appeal by the defendant of a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.'0 In both Miller I and Miller IH,
the Commission on the Status of Women spent state funds to
encourage members of the public to contact state legislators and
urge them to support the proposed equal rights amendment to the
United States Constitution.' 2'
In Miller I, the court stated that since the commission did not
have explicit authorization to spend public funds in support of a
political viewpoint, and since the commission was advocating a
position before the electorate, the commission violated the Stanson
prohibitions." In so holding, the court affirmed the first two
113. Id. at 644, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
114. d at 648, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
115. Id at 652, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
116. 87 Cal. App. 3d 762, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1978).
117. 151 Cal. App. 3d 693, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1984).
118. MillerI, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 772,151 Cal. Rptr. at 202; MillerllI, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 702,
198 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
119. Miller 1, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
120. Miller H, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 703, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
121. Id at 697, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
122. Miller I, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 201. The court noted:
It is one thing for a public agency to present its point of view to the
Legislature. It is quite another for it to use the public treasury to fmance an
appeal to the voters to lobby the Legislature in support of the agency's point
of view. The latter "undermines or distorts the legislative process" just as
clearly as the use of the public treasury to mount an election campaign ...
[distorts] the integrity of the electoral process.
Id (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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prongs of the Stanson test." The court slightly modified the third
prong, however, by stating that the purpose of the activity was not
crucial, but rather the audience to whom the activity was directed
would determine whether the expenditure was permissible." The
court cited Stanson for this proposition," although the Stanson
decision never stated that the audience is crucial to the third prong
of the test.'26 The Miller I court concluded that because the
"audience" in this case was the electorate, the expenditure could
not be characterized as "lobbying" under the third prong, and the
public expenditure was therefore illegal.'27
After Miller I and the subsequent trial court decision in favor
of the plaintiff, the California legislature enacted California
Government Code section 8246."' Section 8246 provides that the
Commission on the Status of Women is not only authorized to
inform the legislature of its views on pending legislation, but also
is authorized to state its position on issues related to the
performance of its other duties."' In Miller II, " the court
affirmed the second prong of the Stanson test and held that section
8246 was explicit authorization by the legislature which "cut the
ground from beneath" the plaintiff's claim."' Since the
123. See id. See also supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text (discussion of the first two
prongs of Stanson).
124. Miller 1, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
125. Id.
126. See generally Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d at 218-20, 551 P.2d at 9-11, 130 Cal. Rptr. at
705-07 (the court distinguished between the purpose of legislative lobbying and the purpose of
influencing the electorate but never stated who the audience of a particular activity had to be).
127. Miller 1 87 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
128. See 1982 Cal. Stat. Ch. 1118 § 1, at 972 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8246).
129. CAL Gov'T CODE § 8246 (Deering Supp. 1990).
130. Miller v. California Commission on Status of Women, 151 Cal. App. 3d 693, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 877 (1984).
131. Id. at 697, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
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commission was "expressly authorized"' 32  to engage in
promotional activities, there was no violation of Stanson.'"
In Fair Political Practices Commission. v. Suitt,"3 the court
held that the expenditure of public funds on campaigns is
impermissible under Stanson.3 5 Michael O'Key, a employee of
the Assembly Democratic Caucus, was relieved of some of his
responsibilities at the caucus to enable him to perform campaign
work on behalf of a political committee working for the reelection
of Assemblyman Tom Suitt." O'Key solicited campaign
contributions, coordinated the activities of volunteer workers, and
was substantially responsible for campaign strategy and
132. 1L at 697, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 880. The court indicated that some legislative authorizations
may not be permissible. Id. The court did not explain what grounds, however, could be used to
invalidate objectionable authorizations. l
We do not imply that a legislative warrant for promotional activity is wholly
insulated from all but constitutional reproof. We doubt the warrant was
intended to authorize advocacy of election of candidates for public office based
upon their stand on matters affecting the status of women. Be that as it may,
no allegation of improper promotional activities is made out by plaintiffs'
pleadings.
133. Ia at 698, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 881. The court then turned to the broader question of whether
the expenditure was a violation of the first amendment to the Constitution. L The court found that
there was no violation of the first amendment since, "This claim fails to make the critical distinction
between the 'government's addition of its own voice [and the] government's silencing of others."'
IL at 702, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (citation omitted). The issue was whether the government
participation in campaigning squelched others' views and thus deprived them of their first amendment
right to free speech. See generally Yudof, When Governments Speak, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 863, 865
(1979) (explaining when the speech of government infringes on individuals' right to free speech).
"Government expression is critical to the question of a democratic polity, but the power of
governments to communicate is also the power to destroy the underpinnings of government by
consent." L Since the Stanson rule only addresses expenditures which have not been authorized by
the legislature, the issue arises as to what standard should be applied to legislatively authorized
government expenditures for political purposes. The standard as expressed by Lawrence Tribe is that
the government can add its voice but in doing so cannot squelch other voices. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-4, at 588 (1978).
134. 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 153 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1979).
135. L at 130, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 314. The central issue in Suitt was whether a legislator was
compelled to report public campaign expenditures under the Political Reform Act. L at 128, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 313. The court held that any expenditure for political purposes, including public
expenditures, must be reported. Id at 133-34, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 316-17.
136. L at 127, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13.
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planning. 37 While performing campaign work, O'Key continued
to receive his full state salary."8
The Fair Political Practices Commission filed a civil suit for
injunctive relief and damages claiming that Suitt and the committee
had violated the reporting obligations of the Political Reform
Act.'39 The court held that there had been a violation of the act
and that the activities in question were in violation of the Stanson
rule that public funds cannot be used for campaign purposes unless
explicitly authorized by the legislature."4 The court stated that the
use of state employees to "solicit contributions, plan campaign
strategy, coordinate volunteers, and prepare the campaign budget,
all at state expense, is in no way a proper part of a legislator's
official functions; that is not to be questioned.""' The decision
in Suitt focused on the issue of whether the political expenditures
in question had to be reported under the Political Reform Act, and
therefore only briefly discussed the Stanson standard. 2 It appears
from the short discussion that the court did not attempt to modify
the three prongs of Stanson.1"
In California Common Cause v. Duffy,'" the court held that
it was improper to use public funds to "take sides" in an election
contest.4 In this case, the San Diego County Sheriff, John Duffy,
encouraged sheriff's deputies to distribute postcards advocating the
removal of then California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose
137. Id. at 127, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
138. Id. at 128, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
139. Id. The Political Reform Act was adopted as an initiative measure in June 1974. See
generally CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 81000-91015 (Deering 1989 & Supp. 1990) (Political Reform Act).
The act covers a wide range of matters involving public officials, including lobbying, conflict of
interest, and campaign disclosure. Id. The act does not address the issue of public expenditures on
campaign activities. Id.
140. Suitt, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 131-33, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 315-17.
141. Id. at 130, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
142. See id. See also CAL GoV'T. CODE §§ 81000-91015 (Deering 1989 & Supp. 1990)
(Political Reform Act).
143. See Suirt, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
144. 200 Cal. App. 3d 730, 246 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1987).
145. Id at 746, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
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Bird.'" Moreover, Duffy informed deputies that they were
welcome to distribute the anti-Bird postcards while on duty. 47
A public interest group, California Common Cause, sued Duffy
on -the basis that the salaries of on-duty sheriff's deputies were paid
by the government and that the deputies were involved in
"promotional" campaign activity."4 Since the confirmation of a
California Supreme Court justice was an issue in the next election,
and since Duffy was using public funds to encourage voters to vote
against the confirmation, Common Cause claimed that the
expenditures were a violation of Stanson1 49 Duffy claimed that
since the distribution of post cards was two years before the
confirmation election and since Rose Bird was not yet a candidate,
the deputies' activities were nonpolitical and nonpartisan and
therefore exempt from Stanson.'" The court rejected Duffy's
arguments and stated that spending government funds to take sides
in an election contest, partisan or nonpartisan, violates the first
prong of Stanson. The court held, without modifying the three
prongs of Stanson, that Duffy's postcards were promotional
because they did not present a fair and impartial view of the Chief
Justice's opinions, but instead argued only one side."2
C. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Case Law
Ordinarily, a critical review of cases and statutes would
provide a sufficient background when analyzing prior case law. The
area of public campaign expenditures presents several problems,
however, which require an analysis of the theoretical underpinnings
of the cases. First, since there are only four California Supreme
146. Id at 739, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
147. Id
148. Id at 739, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
149. Id
150. Id. at 747, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. There was no appellate review of the merits of the
case, since Duffy did not appeal the judgment against him. Id at 740, 246 Cal. Rptr. 288. It was in
the context of Duffy's appeal of attorneys' fees that the court discussed the merits. Id at 740, 748,
246 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293.
151. Id at 747, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.
152. Id at 748, 246 Cal. Rptr. 293.
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Court cases to date which have dealt with the issue, the case law
provides little guidance for analyzing recent opinions.
Second, the nature of the public expenditure prohibition is
deeply rooted in policy and fairness considerations. In Mines,
Stanson, and Stevens, the California Supreme Court balanced basic
fairness concerns and, in addition, discussed the policy implications
of the decisions.'53 Moreover, the newer appellate court cases have
decided issues not previously considered by the supreme court."
It is therefore important to understand the basis, or underpinnings,
supporting the decisions by the supreme court. The policies
underlying past court decisions will also be helpful in determining
whether new cases further the original intent of previous cases or
whether the new decisions are contrary to longstanding goals and
policies.
A number of underlying policies are common to all of the
aforementioned cases.'55 The rationale for prohibiting the use of
public funds for political purposes can be condensed into three
basic policies.' 6 First, the use of public money is unfair to those
who oppose the view the government promotes.5 7 Second, using
tax dollars to advocate one position before the voters distorts the
free election system by distorting the pure and free choice of the
people.' 8 Third, political gains in the electoral process due to the
expenditure of public funds unfairly promote the philosophies of
the current officeholders. 59
153. See supra notes 23-107 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale in the Mines,
Stanson, and Stevens cases).
154. See supra notes 23-107 and accompanying text (outlining the issues previously considered
by the supreme court).
155. See infra notes 160-84 and accompanying text (explaining that the important policies
underlying the cases are fairness, preservation of the integrity of the electoral process, and prevention
of unwarranted influence exerted by an officeholder over his successor).
156. Id
157. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text (explaining that these expenditures are
unfair because they unduly favor one side in an election contest).
158. See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text (demonstrating that elections can be
weighted in favor of one faction if public financing is available).
159. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text (explaining that each newly elected official
should be free to implement his own policies and not be burdened by the policies of his predecessor).
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1. Unfairness
The use of tax dollars collected from citizens with various
political viewpoints to advocate the views of only one segment of
the citizenry is unfair to those who oppose the viewpoint."c Mines
specifically addressed this issue, stating that "to use said public
funds to advocate the adoption of a proposition which was opposed
by a large number of said electors would be manifestly unfair and
unjust to the rights of said last-named electors."'' In addition, the
Mines court noted that such an expenditure would be unfair
because all taxpayers have equal rights to the public funds which
were used to benefit only one particular political viewpoint.'62
The court in Stanson echoed the concern in Mines that the use
of public funds was unfair to those who opposed the political views
espoused by the public official."e In Stanson, the court
specifically stated that the government may not bestow "an unfair
advantage" on one of several competing factions."6 Other state
courts expressed similar concerns." The underlying importance
of this policy is that expenditures should be considered in light of
the benefit bestowed upon one side of an election campaign.'" If
160. Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 287, 257 P. 530, 537 (1927).
161. Id.
162. Id. The court stated that "the electors of said city oppoping said bond issue had an equal
right to and interest in the [public] funds ... as those who favored said bonds." I
163. Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 217, 551 P.2d 1, 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 705. See
Mountain States Legal, Etc. v. Denver School District, 459 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D.Colo. 1978)
(discussing the need for neutrality in a school district's presentation of an issue). "If it is assumed
that the board of education has the power to spend public funds and use public facilities for the
purpose of informing the electorate about this issue, there is strong precedent for requiring fairness
and neutrality in that effort." le,
164. Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 217, 551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
165. See Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of Education of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 13
NJ. 172 (1953). The Supreme Court of New Jersey emphasized the unfairness of government
intervention for one side in an election, "'We are persuaded, however, that simple fairness and justice
to the rights of dissenters require that the use by public bodies of public funds for advocacy be
restrained .... " lIt; Richard L Anderson v. City of Boston, 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978).
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts discussed "fairness" in its decision to uphold a state's right
to prohibit local governments from engaging it partisan activities, "The Commonwealth has a
substantial, compelling interest in assuring the fairness of elections and the appearance of fairness
in the electoral process. It may protect that interest by excluding its political subdivisions from
partisan involvement in election questions .... " Id.
166. Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 217, 551 P.2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
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a government expenditure assists one side of a campaign, then it
has unfairly put the opposition at a disadvantage."
2. Distortion of the Free Election System
Some courts have held that using public funds to promote one
viewpoint in an election is impermissible because it fundamentally
alters the free election system." In Gould v. Grubb," the
California Supreme Court noted that free elections "untainted by
extraneous artificial advantages" are essential to the survival of a
democracy."0 The court reasoned that when the government
intervenes in the electoral process by favoring one side, the free
choice of the people is distorted.'
Likewise, the Stanson court stated that the proposition that
government may not favor one side in an election contest is a basic
tenet of our democratic system." The court reasoned that our
commitment to free elections requires that public officials not
interfere by favoring one side over another.' Similarly, the court
in Duffy noted that expenditure of public funds for political
purposes will have the effect of emphasizing the state's viewpoint
to the exclusion of competing viewpoints.' To the extent that
167. Id
168. See infra notes 169-79 and accompanying text (explaining that allowing public funds to
be spent on one side of a campaign skews the election in favor of that side).
169. 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975) (invalidating the placing of
incumbents' names first on ballots as a violation of the United States and California constitutional
equal protection clauses.)
170. Id at 677, 536 P.2d at 1348, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
171. Id The court stated, "A fundamental goal of a democratic society is to attain the free and
pure expression of the voters' choice of candidates. To that end, our state and federal Constitutions
mandate that the government must, if possible, avoid any feature that might adulterate or, indeed,
frustrate, that free and pure choice." Id
172. Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206,217,551 P.2d 1, 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 705 (1976). The
court stated that a "'fundamental precept of this nation's democratic electoral process is that the
government may not 'take sides' in election contests .... - Id
173. Id at 227, 551 P.2d at 16, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 712. The court stated, "In our polity, the
constitutional commitment to 'free elections' guarantees an electoral process free of partisan
intervention by the current holders of governmental authority or the current trustees of the public
treasury." Id
174. California Common Cause v. Duffy, 200 Cal. App. 3d 730, 747-48,246 Cal. Rptr. 285,
292-93 (1987).
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competing viewpoints are lessened or are not heard, the proponents
of that viewpoint are denied access to the electoral process. ' The
court stated that an election must allow for equal access of
competing views and that without equal access, free elections are
distorted.' 76
Other state courts have expressed similar views. In Stern v.
Kramarsky,7 a New York trial court stated, "The spectacle of
state agencies campaigning for or against propositions or proposed
constitutional amendments to be voted on by the public, albeit
perhaps well-motivated, can only demean the democratic
process."' 78 The court added, "For government agencies to
attempt to influence public opinion on such matters inhibits the
democratic process through the misuse of government funds and
prestige. Improper expenditure of funds, whether directly through
promotional and advertising activities or indirectly through the use
of government employees or facilities cannot be countenanced." 7 '
3. Perpetuation of Officeholders' Ideals
Many courts have expressed a concern that the use of public
funds for political purposes affords current officeholders the
opportunity to use thier official power unfairly to perpetuate their
own ideals. 8' One important aspect of our free election system is
that the victorious candidate or ballot measure is not subject to the
philosophies of the losing candidate or ballot measure."' Simply
stated, the victor in a candidate election must be free to implement
his or her policies unrestrained by a predecessor's previous official
power. If the previous officeholder has improperly used his or her
175. Id.
176. 1&.
177. 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.$. 2d 235 (1975).
178. Id. at 452, 375 N.Y.S. 2d at 239.
179. Id.
180. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (explaining that our system of government
is designed to allow the victor the opportunity to freely implement his policies, and explaining that
the use of public funds by an official's predecessor may hamper the official's abilities to implement
those policies).
181. Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 217, 551 P.2d 1, 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 705.
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office to pass measures which reflect the old policies or has used
public funds to elect political allies, the newly elected officeholder
is at an immediate disadvantage in carrying out new policies."
The Stanson court stated that a "principal danger feared by our
country's founders lay in the possibility that the holders of
governmental authority would use official power improperly to
perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in office .... [Tihe selective
use of public funds in election campaigns, of course, raises the
specter of just such an improper distortion of the democratic
electoral process.' 183
When one considers whether a particular government
expenditure should be allowed, it is important to examine whether
the expenditure promotes a particular political philosophy to the
exclusion of other philosophies. While there may be some
legitimate government activity which involves promotion of
particular policy viewpoints, publicly financed advocation of
specific issues unfairly biases the electorate to favor the position of
the current officeholders.' 4 If a state expenditure perpetuates a
particular point of view in an election contest, the policy
underlying many of the cases would require that the expenditure
should be disallowed.
II. CONFLICT IN THE CALIFORmA COURTS OF APPEAL
A. League of Women Voters v. Countywide Criminal Justice
Coordination Commission
In a recent decision, League of Women Voters v. Countywide
Criminal Justice Coordination Commission,,8 5 the Court of Appeal
for the Second District held that it was permissible for a public
182. ld.
183. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 52, 53 (Madison); 10 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND
PAPERS oF THE PRESIDEmS 98-99 (1899) (Jefferson)).
184. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF.
L. REV. 1104, 1104 (1979) ("The government has the potential to use its unmatched arsenal of media
resources and legislative prerogatives to obtain political ends, to nullify the effectiveness of criticism,
and thus, to undermine the principle of self-government").
185. 203 Cal. App. 3d 529, 250 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1988).
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agency to spend public funds on collecting polling data, drafting
language, and obtaining a campaign consultant for a measure which
was to appear on the ballot.186 In League of Women Voters, the
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors established a
commission to investigate the possibility of reforming the county's
criminal justice system.187 Included in the investigation was an
examination of the feasibility of reforming the system by passing
a local initiative.' The county spent a considerable amount of
public money on, and assigned a significant number of employees
to, initiative-related tasks.89 The publicly funded activities
included, but were not limited to, drafting an initiative, exploring
public sentiment with respect to the initiative, finding a proponent
for the initiative, developing fundraising ideas for the initiative, and
discussing with a campaign advisor the advisability of sending a
direct mail piece."9'
The court decided that these expenditures were not a violation
of the third prong of Stanson since they were not directly aimed at
influencing voters.'9' The court found that the expenditures simply
supported preparatory activities." The court held that the
activities were more akin to legislative lobbying than campaigning
since the task force did not undertake to directly influence any
voter."'93
186. 11 at 554, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78.
187. l at 532-33, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
188. L at 533, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
189. l at 534, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
190. L at 533-539, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 163-67.
191. kd at 554, 250 CaL Rptr. at 177-78. The court stated, "'The audience at which these
activities are directed is not the electorate per se, but only potentially interested private citizens; there
is no attempt to persuade or influence any vote. It follows those activities cannot reasonably be
construed as partisan campaigning." Id at 550, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
192. Id at 549, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 174. Moreover, the court in League of Women Voters
suggested that public expenditures by state agencies will raise the Stanson prohibition, where similar
expenditures by local school districts would be permissible. L The distinction between school
districts and state agencies is based on the scope of their authorization. IL Since school districts
generally have broader legislative authorization, the court argued that it will be easier to find that
school districts are authorized to make promotional expenditures. Id. See Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal.
3d 206,220,551 P.2d 1, 11, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697,706 (1976) (stating that a locally autonomous school
board possesses broad legislative and fiscal authority).
193. League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 547-49, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74.
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The court relied on Stevens to the extent that Stevens
authorized the use of public funds for drafting purposes." The
League of Women Voters decision adopted the rationale from
Stevens which stated that the activities in question were legislative
in nature and could not be considered campaigning.19" The court
also relied on the statements in Miller P' which suggested that
the third prong of Stanson is violated only if a promotional activity
is directed at a particular audience.'97 The Miller I court stated
that unless the activity is directed to the electorate, the activity
does not violate Stanson.l9
The legal conclusion reached in League of Women Voters can
be viewed as the final step of a three-step modification of the third
prong of Stanson. First, Stanson held that "legislative lobbying"
194. Id. It is arguable that drafting an initiative uses public funds to benefit one side in an
election contest and should therefore be disallowed. California Government Code section 10243
provides, however, that the legislative counsel must provide drafting assistance to proponents of an
initiative if the legislative counsel is requested to do so in writing by at least 25 electors proposing
the measure, and if in the judgment of the legislative counsel there is a reasonable probability that
the measure will be submitted to the voters of the state under the laws relating to the submission of
initiatives. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 10243 (Deering 1982). To the extent that public funds will
necessarily be available to both sides of an election contest, one avoids the problem of the
government unfairly "taking sides" in an election contest. See supra notes 153-84 and accompanying
text (discussing the problem of the government taking sides). It is worth noting that there would be
problems with enforcing a prohibition on the use of public funds to draft an initiative. Since
legislative bills are public records and any member of the public can utilize the publicly financed
drafting found in legislative bills, there would be no practical method for enforcing a rule which
required individuals to reimburse the state for time spent drafting legislation.
195. League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 547-49, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74. In
Stevens, the court held that the drafting activities in question were "'legislative" and not
..campaigning" since the measure was a legislative constitutional amendment. Stevens v. Geduldig,
42 Cal. 3d 24, 36, 719 P.2d 1001, 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. 405, 412 (1986). Although the court in
League of Women Voters relied on the Stevens rationale, an important distinction can be drawn
between the facts in League of Women Voters and the facts in Stevens. In Stevens the measure in
question was a legislative constitutional amendment. l In League of Women Voters, the measure
was an initiative and therefore would never appear before the legislature. League of Women Voters,
203 Cal. App. 3d at 534, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 165. Even though the court never referred to the measure
as a legislative measure, the court analogized between legislative activities and the preparation
activities. I&a at 550, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 175. The only rationale offered to support this conclusion was
that the preparation activities in League of Women Voters, like legislative activities, were not
designed to influence voters. Id.
196. Miller v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 762, 768, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197, 201 (1978).
197. League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 545-46, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72.
198. Miller I, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
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activities were permissible while "election" activities were not."'9
Second, Miller I expanded this notion by holding that real issue
was not the objective of the promotional activity but rather the
audience to which the activity was directed.2 The law after
Miller I, then, was that it was illegal to use public funds to
influence voters on an issue, even though the political issue in
question was pending only before the legislature and would never
be submitted directly to the voters.2"' The final step of the
modification of the third prong of Stanson was taken by the court
in League of Women Voters."
League of Women Voters utilized the audience distinction in
Miller I, but in so doing created a new rule that contravened all
prior case law on this topic."0 3 In League of Women Voters, the
court held that if political activities undertaken at public expense
did not attempt to directly influence any voter, then the activities
were not aimed at the "audience" of the electorate, and were,
instead, considered preparation activities.2"' The court reasoned
that these expenditures were permissible based on the "audience"
distinction in Miller 1,0 and the "legislative purpose" distinction
in Stanson" A recent California Attorney General Opinion
stated that the League of Women Voters decision stands for the
proposition that public funds spent on drafting is permissible, but
that spending public funds to gather signatures to qualify an
199. Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 218-19, 551 P.2d 1, 9-10, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 705-06
(1976).
200. Miller 1, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 201. The court reasoned that when
public funds were used to encourage the voters to lobby their legislators in support of a particular
legislative measure, in this case the equal rights amendment to the United States Constitution, that
the audience was the voters and therefore the expenditure was a violation of Stanson. ICL
201. Id
202. See League of Women Voters v. Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination Commission,
203 Cal. App. 3d 529, 555, 250 Cal. Rptr. 161, 178 (1988). See also supra notes 185-198 and
accompanying text (absent an attempt to directly influence voters, a public expenditure is
permissible).
203. See League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 555, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
204. Id.
205. Id. See Miller I, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
206. See League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 555, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 178; see also
Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 218-19, 551 P.2d 1, 9-10, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 705-06 (1988).
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initiative crosses "the line of improper advocacy or promotion of
a single point of view in an effort to influence the electorate."'
Prior to League of Women Voters, no California court had held
that absent an attempt to directly influence voters, a publicly
financed political activity was per se permissible. No other decision
had approved bestowing advantages to one viewpoint in an
election."' In fact, Mines and Stanson directly prohibited the use
of public money to assist one viewpoint in an election
campaign."°
Not only did the League of Women Voters case directly
conflict with previous holdings, the decision contravened the three
enumerated policies against the use of public money for political
purposes."' The three policies suggest that one cannot give an
advantage, at public expense, to one viewpoint in an election
campaign. There are numerous activities in which the state could
engage that would benefit a campaign either for a candidate or a
ballot measure which would not directly influence the voters.2"'
For example, driving a candidate to the airport, polling voters to
allow the campaign manager to craft a campaign strategy, and
conducting a consultant search to select the best personnel for work
on a campaign all arguably do not directly influence voters.2 ' Yet
all such activities would be unfair to the opposition, distort the free
election process, and perpetuate the philosophies of the current
207. 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (August 30, 1990)
208. It can be argued that the court in Stevens approved bestowing a slight advantage to one
side of a campaign. While the court never explicitly stated that assisting one side in an election is
legally acceptable, the court's holding permits such activities, at least in the context of legislative
amendments and bond measures. See Stevens v. Geduldig, 42 Cal. 3d 24, 36,719 P.2d 1001, 1008,
227 Cal. Rptr. 405, 412 (1986).
209. See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying text (discussing the policy expressed in Stanson
and Mines that assisting one viewpoint distorts the free election system).
210. See supra notes 153-84 and accompanying text (explaining the three enumerated policies).
211. See infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text (explaining that indirect activities such as
polling and drafting can benefit one side of a measure).
212. See generally League of Women Voters v. Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination
Commission, 203 Cal. App. 3d 529, 545-47, 250 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171-73 (1988) (explaining that to
meet the requirement of directly influencing voters requires that one directly attempt to persuade at
least one voter).
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officeholders."3 League of Women Voters is offensive to the
principles expressed in Stanson and Mines and, if left unmodified,
may serve to undercut the prohibition on the expenditure of state
funds on election campaigns." '
Ill. PROPOSAL
A. Deficiencies in the Stanson Standard
The ambiguities in the three prong test established in Stanson,
as evidenced by the disagreement in the courts of appeal, are the
result of two failures."5 First, the three prong test is not clearly
defined in the cases. The test, as described in this Comment, is a
synthesis of all of the case law and has not been clearly expressed
in any California court decision. The unwillingness of courts to
clearly identify these three prongs and to use the policies
underlying the prongs has led to confusion among courts of
appeal."6 Specifically, the League of Women Voters decision
attempted to modify the third prong of the test to exclude activities
213. See supra notes 153-84 and accompanying text (explaining when the three policies are
violated). All of these activities have one thing in common; they all benefit one side in an election
campaign. When one side of an election is benefited by the use of public funds, the three policies
stated above are violated.
214. See infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text (explaining that legalizing public
expenditures which are not directly aimed at the electorate allows many expenditures which
contravene the underlying policies of the cases). Since League of Women Voters, one California
Supreme Court decision and one decision in the Third District Court of Appeal have discussed
Stanson. See Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 767 P.2d 1020, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1989), revd
110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990); Harvey v. Butte, 203 Cal. App. 3d 714, 250 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1988). The
treatment of Stanson in both of these cases is superficial and simply reiterates the Stanson guidelines.
See Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1170-72, 767 P.2d at 1031-33, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 553-54; Harvey, 203 Cal.
App. 3d at 719, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
215. Stanson, Mines, and other early cases expressly prohibited public officials from bestowing
an unfair advantage upon one side of a political campaign. See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying
text (stating that one cannot bestow an advantage to one side of an election contest). The court in
League of Women Voters allowed such activities based on distinctions which subvert the original
policies enumerated in Stanson and Mines. See infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text (explaining
that the "directly influence any voter" test fails to adequately guard against a perversion of the
election process).
216. See supra notes 108-52, 208-14 and accompanying text (explaining that different courts
of appeal have interpreted the Stanson prongs differently).
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that did not directly influence voters. 17 The League of Women
Voters modification of the third prong of Stanson has resulted in
differing interpretations in the courts of appeal. 18
Second, there is great potential for confusion over the
"promotional/informational" prong and the "purpose/audience"
prong of Stanson.21 "Promotional," as was discussed in Stanson,
meant that both sides of an issue had not been fairly presented."
There is no indication in Stanson that the promotional or
informational characteristic of an activity is dependent on the
audience to which the message is directed." The issue of whether
an activity must be directed at influencing the electorate, as was
disputed in League of Women Voters, is not resolved by asking
whether the activity was promotional.
Although the explicit language of the Stanson decision does
not directly contradict the League of Women Voters decision, the
policies underlying Stanson and other early cases are in
contradiction with the holding in League of Women Voters. As
noted earlier, the policies reject public expenditures which assist
one side of a campaign.' Choosing a campaign consultant,
drafting, and polling activities, which were allowed in League of
Women Voters, create an unfair advantage to one side of a
campaign, use tax dollars to distort the free election system, and
217. See generally League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d 529, 545-46, 250 Cal. Rptr.
161, 171-72 (1988). See infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
.'audience" distinction does not effectively prohibit public officials from spending public money for
political purposes).
218. See League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 550, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 175 (holding that
only expenditures which directly attempt to influence votes are prohibited); Cf. California Common
Cause v. Duffy, 200 Cal. App. 3d 730,748,246 Cal. Rptr. 285,293 (1987) (holding that promotional
activities which favor one side or the other in an election are impermissible). See infra notes 220-30
and accompanying text (explaining that the League of Women Voters standard allows some
expenditures which would be impermissible in other jurisdictions).
219. See supra notes 49-68 and accompanying text (explaining the prongs of Stanson).
220. Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 222, 551 P.2d 1, 12, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 708 (1976).
221. It appears that "'promotional" turns on whether one has presented both sides of an issue
fairly. Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 221, 551 P.2d at 11, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 707. The definition of
."audience," however, turns on whom one addresses. League of Women Voters v. Countywide
Criminal Justice Coordination Commission, 203 Cal. App. 3d 529, 545-46, 250 Cal. Rptr. 161, 172
(1988).
222. See supra notes 153-84 and accompanying text (discussing the basis for rejecting
expenditures which benefit one side in an election campaign).
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perpetuate the campaign wishes of the current public officials.'
In establishing that there are activities which are not promotional
and yet are contrary to the three enumerated policies, this Comment
advocates a modification of the three prongs of Stanson.
Since the only objectionable public expenditures in League of
Women Voters were those which directly attempted to influence a
voter m there were some public political expenditures, those
which did not directly target voters, which were approved by the
court. In order to contravene three enumerated policies, however,
a promotional activity does not have to directly influence a
voter.' An unfair advantage can be bestowed upon one side of
a campaign without appealing directly to the electorate. 6 For
example, a campaign contribution, either a monetary or an in-kind
(nonmonetary) contribution, is not necessarily an appeal to the
electorate, although it will benefit only one side. 7 To allow the
use of public funds to benefit one side of a campaign and at the
same time prohibit the use of public funds to directly influence
voters is to rely on a false distinction. When public assistance is
provided for noninfluencing preparatory activities, a campaign
manager can simply allocate the campaign's nonpublic resources
to influencing activities and allow the government to pay the bill
for the campaign's noninfluencing activities.
This Comment does not suggest that the Stanson standard or
the three-prong test should be completely abandoned. "8 The term
"promotional" adequately describes activities that should be
prohibited based on their direct influence on the electorate."9
223. See supra notes 153-84 and accompanying text (explaining that any assistance to a
campaign which relieves the campaign's necessity to spend funds benefits a campaign).
224. League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d 529, 550, 250 Cal. Rptr. 161, 175 (1988).
225. See supra notes 153-84 and accompanying text (the test of "directly influencing a voter"
does not preserve the three enumerated policy objectives).
226. See supra notes 153-84 and accompanying text (any indirect assistance to a campaign may
unfairly benefit one side of a campaign).
227. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text (explaining that benefits to one side of an
election may include a relief from financial obligations).
228. See supra notes 49-68 and accompanying text (explaining the three prong standard).
229. See generally League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d 529,554,250 Cal. Rptr. 161,
177-78 (1988) (standing for the proposition that activities which are promotional and have a direct
influence on the electorate are prohibited). See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text (explaining
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However, the term fails to encompass the wide variety of activities
that unfairly benefit one side of an election but may not directly
influence voters.' Unfortunately, the term "promotion" is
inadequate, to the extent that courts can and have interpreted the
term to be exclusive of preparatory work for a measure or
candidate if the work did not directly attempt to influence
voters." Although one may agree with the Stanson court that the
line between proper informational activities and improper campaign
expenditures is not always clear, "2 it can be asserted that the gray
line has been drawn in the wrong place.
B. Changes in the Stanson Standard
Recent judicial approval of publicly financed political
activities--activities which created an advantage for one viewpoint
in an election campaign --has generated a need to reform the
Stanson standard. The following suggestions could logically be
incorporated into future California Supreme Court rulings on
Stanson issues. Since the three prongs of the Stanson test come
close to embodying the three principles set forth in the "theoretical
underpinnings" section of this Comment,' it would be unwise
to abandon these criteria. A more prudent course would be for the
California Supreme Court to develop an additional requirement
which clarifies these prongs and prohibits those activities which
have unjustifiably been allowed by the League of Women Voters
decision.
that promotional activities are activities which advocate one side of an issue or do not fairly present
both sides of an issue).
230. See generally League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 554, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 177-
78. (standing for the proposition that the term "promotional" does not prevent courts from finding
that some publicly-financed activities which benefit only one side in an election campaign are legal).
See supra notes 185-207 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the term -promotional" did not
dissuade a court from allowing public expenditures which assisted one side of a campaign).
231. See generally League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 554,250 Cal. Rptr. at 177-
78.
232. See Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206,224,551 P.2d 1, 14, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697,709 (1976).
233. See supra notes 185-207 and accompanying text (explaining the holding in the League
of Women Voters case).
234. See supra notes 153-84 and accompanying text (theoretical underpinnings).
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This Comment suggests that the current standards for political
reporting obligations be adopted for the determination of improper
government expenditures. Although the Stanson court used the
terms "promotional activity" and "campaign activity"
interchangeably,'' 5 the court never suggested that the existing
requirements for reporting campaign activities be incorporated into
the prohibition of the use of public funds.
California Government Code section 82015, a section within
the Political Reform Act,' defines the term "contribution" for
purposes of reporting political expenditures and receipts as "a
payment . . . except to the extent that full and adequate
consideration is received unless it is clear from the surrounding
circumstances that it is not made for political purposes .... The
term contribution further includes any transfer of anything of value
received by a committee from another committee, unless full and
adequate consideration is received."' "37 The California Code of
Regulations defines "political purpose" as not only attempting to
influence the action of voters with respect to qualification and
passage of a measure, but also as any payment, monetary or
nonmonetary, received by or made at the behest of a candidate, a
controlled committee, or an organization formed or existing
primarily for political purposes."
In Fair Political Practices Commission v. Suitt,2" the court
held that the use of state funds to solicit campaign contributions,
plan campaign strategy, coordinate volunteers, and prepare a
campaign budget were "unambiguously political." '  Although
the activities in Suitt did not attempt to directly influence voters,
235. Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 215-16, 551 P.2d 1, 7-8, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 703-04
(1976).
236. CALIF. GOV'T CODE §§ 81001-91015 (Deering 1989 and Supp. 1989) (Political Reform
Act).
237. Id. § 82015 (Deering 1989). Government Code Section 82015 additionally states, in part,
"'Contribution' means a payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan by a third party, or
an enforceable promise to make payment, unless it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that
it is not made for political purposes." Id
238. 2 CAL. CODE REGS. § 18215 (1989).
239. 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 153 Cal Rptr. 311 (1979).
240. L at 131, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
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they were held to be reportable expenditures. Under the League
of Women Voters rationale, such political expenditures would not
be prohibited since they were not directed at the electorate.
242
However under the modified "political" standard, it would make
no difference whether the activity was directed at the electorate.
Under the modified standard the activity would be prohibited. 3
Since the "contribution" definition encompasses any political
activity which would contribute value to a campaign, and not just
activities that attempt to influence a voter, the three prongs of
Stanson would be broadened to protect the concerns originally
expressed in Stanson, namely that one side of an election would
not be unfairly advantaged, free of the limitations imposed by
League of Women Voters. Any activity which bestows an advantage
to one side of a campaign would fall within the definition of
241. Id.
242. See League of Women Voters v. Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination Commission,
203 Cal. App. 3d 529, 554, 250 Cal. Rptr. 161, 177-78 (1988) (holding that publicly financed
political expenditures are not prohibited if they are not directed at the electorate).
243. Opponents of this proposal may argue that the League of Women Voters court, when
examining the reporting obligations of the commission, held that the activities in question did not
violate the political standard. They would also argue that since these activities were approved in
League of Women Voters, future courts using the political standard would approve similar activities.
Finally they may assert that if courts would approve the type of activities involved in League of
Women Voters using the political test, the proposal in this comment-to use the political standard-
would not prohibit the very activities which have been said to violate all previous case law. It is not
disputed that the League of Women Voters decision held that there were no reporting obligations in
that case under the political test. League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 561, 250 Cal. Rptr.
at 182. The rationale for this holding, however, does not apply to the issue of public expenditures.
The reason the League of Women Voters court found no reporting obligation is that at the time of
the expenditures there was no "measure," since the proponents had not yet begun gaining signatures
to qualify the initiative for the ballot. Id. In the context of public expenditure prohibitions, there is
no requirement that a measure be in existence before the expenditure is illegal. In fact, under Stanson
the test is much broader. Only that the "style, tenor, and timing" indicate that the expenditure was
made to promote of one side in an election contest. Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 221-22, 551
P.2d 1, 12, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 708 (1976). There are other cases which support this contention. In
Duffy, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the public expenditure was permissible.
California Common Cause v. Duffy, 200 Cal. App. 3d 730,748,246 Cal. Rptr. 285,293 (1987). The
defendant argued that the campaign against the confirmation of a California Supreme Court justice,
sponsored by public funds, was legal since the justice was not yet a candidate and since the election
was to be held two years in the future. Id. The court stated that the fact that the retention election
was more than two years away did not make the activities any less political. Id Therefore, one can
conclude that the "measure" distinction relied upon by League of Women Voters in the reporting
context would not be applicable in the public expenditure context. The proposal set forth in this
Comment, then, would prohibit the activities which were allowed in League of Women Voters.
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"contribution."' Following from the Suitt rationale, activities
involving polling, drafting, and soliciting sponsors would be
considered contributions in support of a campaign. Therefore, even
though a public expenditure may not attempt to directly influence
voters, the expenditure would be illegal if it benefitted one side in
an election campaign.
Another reason for adopting the Political Reform Act definition
of "contribution" 5 into the Stanson standard is to consolidate
enforcement actions by the Fair Political Practices Commission
with suits challenging a public official's use of public money.
Under the current standard, the propriety of a state political
expenditure is based on whether it meets the three prongs of the
Stanson test.' Yet the requirements regarding reporting of the
expenditure are based on the definition of "contribution." 7
Since, under League of Women Voters, the promotional standard
encompasses only those activities directed at the electorate and
since the term "contribution" encompasses a wide variety of
political activities, the possibility arises that a public official may
be required to report permissible publicly funded political activities.
The possibility of such reporting raises two problems. First, a
public official would be reluctant to declare a campaign
expenditure on a public report that he believes, relying on Stanson,
is an improper expenditure of public money. Public officials would
have a strong incentive not to comply with the reporting
obligations lest their disclosure would cause suspicion as to the
propriety of their publicly funded political activities. Second, if
public officials reported political expenditures, the public's
confidence in the integrity of the political process would decrease.
The disclosure of tax-funded political activities supporting one
viewpoint in an election would foster the public perception that
244. See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text (explaining that the definition of
-contribution" embodies the notion of bestowing an advantage).
245. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82015 (Deering 1989) (defimition of the term "contribution" in
the Political Reform Act). See also supra notes 236-238 and accompanying text (discussion of the
Political Reform Act definition).
246. League of Women Voters, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 545-46, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72.
247. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82015 (Deering 1989).
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elections are not conducted fairly, impartially, and without
government influence.
One weakness of the term "contribution" is that it is defined
as related to "political purposes." Although the regulation sets
forth some details about political purposes, it is unclear how
closely related the purpose and the election must be to qualify as
a political purpose.48 Adding the ambiguous "contribution" term
to other ambiguous terms, such as "promotional," does little to
increase certainty in this area of the law. The "contribution"
definition, however, brings us closer to a standard which accurately
reflects the three aforementioned policies. Although there would be
gray area under the new standard, it is a more desirable gray area
than the one existing under the promotional standard. The proposed
standard would categorically prohibit expenditures which, although
unclear under the three prongs as modified by League of Women
Voters, violate the three enumerated policies. For example, polling
may be a gray area under the third "purpose" prong, but would
clearly be prohibited under a "contribution" definition.
This Comment further suggests that the courts adopt a
procedure whereby public entities can recover costs associated with
an activity which was not political at the outset, but later benefitted
an election campaign. The courts should either deny the benefits of
such expenditures or require the public funds to be reimbursed
when the benefits are used for political purposes.2' 9 For example,
polling voters to determine public sentiment on important issues
may be a permissible expenditure of public money. However, if at
some time after the polling data has been compiled and the data is
used for campaign purposes,' the responsible party should
account for the public money spent and reimburse the state for all
248. 2 CAL. CODE REGs. § 18215 (1989) (defining contribution using the term "political
purpose").
249. For example, if public funds are used to draft a legislative bill which later becomes an
initiative, the courts should not allow the use of the draft as an initiative or, in the alternative, the
courts should require the proponents of the initiative to reimburse the state for the costs of drafting.
250. Cf Stevens v. Geduldig, 42 Cal. 3d 24, 36,719 P.2d 1001, 1008,227 Cal. Rptr. 405,412
(holding that the defendant did not have to repay public funds that were spent on drafting). Although
public funds were originally used to draft legislation, the court did not require the proponents to
reimburse the state for drafting expenses when the drafted language became an initiative. Id.
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costs."' A procedure similar to this is already used in the
campaign contribution context. 2
IV. CONCLUSION
The dangers our forefathers recognized 200 years ago have
begun to creep back into the political processes of the 1990's. The
erosion of strict laws prohibiting the improper use of public money
is damaging the integrity of our free election process. In Stanson,
the California Supreme Court created a flexible standard which
seemed to adequately preserve the three expressed underlying
principles. Fifteen years of decisions have proved otherwise.
California is in need of reform and must swiftly cure the
ambiguities in the current legal standard. Defining improper
expenditures as "contributions" appears to be the first step toward
a meaningful limit on the expenditure of public funds for political
purposes.
John A. Lambeth
251. Some might argue that keeping track of past expenditures and accounting for them in the
public expenditure context would create enormous record-keeping problems. There are two responses
to this criticism. First, individuals are currently required to keep this kind of information and report
the information under the Political Reform Act. See infra note 2520 and accompanying text
(regarding reporting expenditures that were not originally reportable). There is no reason why state
and local agencies cannot track this information just as private individuals do now. Second, the
record-keeping responsibilities are fairly insignificant. It is a small burden to require public officials
to keep track of the relatively few expenditures which may at some later date become political.
252. In the Matter of Opinion Requested by Mark Fontana, Treasurer of the Isla Vista
Community Council, 2 FPPC Opinions 25 (1976) (political expenditures made before the question
was placed on the ballot must be reported once the measure qualifies for the ballot). See also League
of Women Voters v. Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination Commission, 203 Cal. App. 3d 529,
558, 250 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1988) (stating that receipts which were not originally contributions under
the Political Reform Act are reportable if they are later used for a political purpose).
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